At the 18th USENIX Workshop on Offensive Technologies, held 12–13 August 2024 in Philadelphia, Tal A. Be’ery of Zengo published “WhatsApp with privacy? Privacy issues with IM E2EE in the Multi-device setting.” The open-access PDF is the independent research this item summarises. The author’s claims, not Meta’s, are that WhatsApp leaks a target’s device-setup information — the phone plus up to four linked companions — to any user, including someone who is blocked or not in the contact list, and that watching that list over time yields intelligence about device replacement, addition, or removal. Recipients, the paper says, can also tell which of the sender’s devices produced a given message. The root cause, Be’ery argues, is not a bungled WhatsApp patch but the Signal/Sesame multi-device pattern: the sender builds pairwise sessions with each of the receiver’s device identity keys, so those public keys must be enumerable. Meta’s 14 July 2021 engineering post, used here as the official description of the same fan-out, said each device has its own identity key, the server maps accounts to device identities, and the sending client encrypts N times. That post presented Automatic Device Verification and extended security codes covering all devices as mitigations against a malicious server adding a silent companion. Be’ery’s privacy claim is orthogonal: even a correctly behaving server that publishes the real device list still reveals how many computers the user has and when the set changes. The paper says the issues are “probably relevant to most IM solutions, including the privacy-oriented Signal Messenger,” because they follow from Sesame. That extension is the author’s, not a Signal Foundation advisory. This briefing does not test Signal. It records a peer-reviewed workshop paper’s argument and the fact that WhatsApp’s own architecture post matches the fan-out premise. Suggested mitigations in the paper include reducing how widely device lists are handed out, aggregating or delaying list updates, and making per-device association harder for recipients. Whether WhatsApp implemented any of those after August 2024 is not established by a loaded Meta post in this workstream. The February 2026 WhatsApp whitepaper still describes client fan-out and per-device identity keys, which is consistent with the architectural premise, not a confession of the metadata leak. WOOT is an offensive-technologies workshop. The paper describes subverting the WhatsApp client to obtain device-setup data. This briefing does not reproduce those steps. The security lesson for users is the outcome the author claims: linked-device counts and changes may be easier for a curious or hostile contact to learn than the UI suggests. What this means in practice People who care about whether contacts can see that a new laptop was linked should not assume E2EE hides that fact. Linking fewer companions, watching the in-app linked-devices screen, and logging out unused web sessions remain the user-accessible controls Meta documents. High-risk users may prefer messengers that do not fan out per-device keys in the same way, understanding that is a product trade-off. Cyber71 cannot audit WhatsApp’s key directory on a user’s behalf or force a protocol change. What is still unclear USENIX HTML for the talk page did not pass a bot challenge; the PDF did load. Whether the leak still works on 2026 clients was not re-tested here. Meta’s key-transparency system addresses substitution of keys, not the mere visibility of how many keys exist. Blocked-user behaviour, rate limits, and business-API accounts are not fully mapped in this short paper. The paper’s postal-service analogy is useful for non-specialists: E2EE hides the letter but the number of padlocks on the counter still tells a watcher how many houses you have. WhatsApp’s 2021 post about extended security codes covering all devices is aimed at detecting an extra padlock a server tried to add. Be’ery’s point is that the real padlocks are already visible. Those are complementary, not contradictory, claims. Until Meta publishes a design that hides companion cardinality, users should assume linked-device count is closer to public metadata than to message body secrecy.

Sources

  1. USENIX WOOT 2024 — WhatsApp with privacy? Privacy issues with IM E2EE in the Multi-device setting2026-09-24
  2. Engineering at Meta — How WhatsApp enables multi-device capability2026-09-24

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