WhatsApp’s current technical account of its cryptography is the Encryption Overview whitepaper, version 9, updated on 25 February 2026. The paper states that chats, group chats, images, videos, voice notes, files, status posts, and WhatsApp calls between sender and receiver clients use the Signal protocol. It says that protocol is designed so that third parties, including WhatsApp, do not have plaintext access to those messages or calls. Because session keys are ephemeral, the paper also says that stealing the keys currently on a device should not let an attacker decrypt previously transmitted messages. The same document is explicit that an account can have several devices, each with its own identity key pair. Compromising one device’s keys, it says, should not let an attacker decrypt traffic sent to other devices on the same account. History that is copied when a new device is registered is itself end-to-end encrypted during transfer. Meta Engineering described the architectural shift that made this possible in a 14 July 2021 post announcing a limited public beta of standalone multi-device. Until then, companion clients on web, macOS, Windows, and Portal had to keep a persistent connection to the phone, which remained the only device that could encrypt for other users. The 2021 post said the new design lets the phone plus up to four non-phone companions operate even if the phone is offline, while still encrypting sync of contacts, archives, and starred messages. The sending pattern is client fan-out. Meta’s 2021 post and the 2026 whitepaper both describe pairwise Signal sessions between every sender device and every recipient device, plus sessions among the sender’s own devices. The sending client encrypts the same payload separately for each destination device. The 2021 post says messages are not stored on the server after delivery. Groups still use the Signal sender-key construction rather than encrypting once per member device for every group message. Voice and video calls generate SRTP master secrets on the initiating device for each of the recipient’s devices; Meta wrote that those secrets stay in client memory for the duration of the call and that WhatsApp servers do not have them. Linking is still gated by the primary device, defined in the whitepaper as the Android or iPhone that registered the phone number. A companion produces a linking secret that is passed by scanning a QR code. The primary signs a device list with its identity key. Companions can be removed by the companion itself, by the primary, or by the WhatsApp server. Signed device lists expire: the whitepaper gives a time-to-live of 35 days or less in ordinary end-to-end encrypted chats, and says that after expiry clients will only message the primary until a fresher signed list arrives. In-chat consistency data can shrink that window to 48 hours or less. Those timers are WhatsApp’s stated way of bounding a compromised companion; they are not independently measurable from outside the app. The whitepaper’s most important limit is definitional. WhatsApp defines end-to-end encryption as encryption from a device the sender controls to a device the recipient controls, with no third party — including WhatsApp or Meta — able to read content in between. It then states, in those words, that communications with Meta services and communications with businesses using Cloud API are not considered end-to-end encrypted. Cloud API, hosted by Meta since 2021 for messaging and since 2023 for calls, receives content on the organisation’s behalf. Linking Cloud API as a companion to the WhatsApp Business app, a path the paper dates to 2024, means one-to-one chats with that business are not treated as end-to-end encrypted and are marked with a system message. Groups, status, and live location are not fanned out to linked Cloud API. Invocation messages to automated accounts, including Meta AI, send a copy of that invocation to the automated participant; other personal messages in a chat that does not contain an automated account remain in the Signal construction. What this means in practice People using WhatsApp between personal clients can treat the 2026 whitepaper as WhatsApp’s own map of the design: separate keys per device, QR-based linking, signed device lists with expiry, and fan-out rather than a single identity key for the whole account. They should still compare security codes out of band if they need assurance the server has not substituted keys, because key transparency (covered separately) is a complement, not a replacement, for that check. Anyone messaging a business should look for the in-chat encryption status. If Cloud API is in the path, WhatsApp itself says the conversation is not end-to-end encrypted. Cyber71 is not a Meta partner and cannot recover accounts, force device unlinking, or obtain privileged logs from WhatsApp. What is still unclear The whitepaper is WhatsApp’s description of its protocol, not an independent audit of the closed-source clients. Implementation details “may differ,” to use the similar caveat Meta printed on the Messenger overview. Outsiders cannot verify that every client build matches the paper, that Cloud API indicators always appear when they should, or that signed-list expiry is enforced as written. Companion-count limits, exact Cloud API TTLs, and the behaviour of Meta’s Private Processing path for AI invocations are stated by WhatsApp rather than measured here.

Sources

  1. WhatsApp — WhatsApp Encryption Overview (Version 9)2026-09-24
  2. Engineering at Meta — How WhatsApp enables multi-device capability2026-09-24

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