Telegram’s public FAQ is unambiguous. Cloud chats — ordinary private chats, groups, and channels — use client-server encryption and live in Telegram’s cloud. Secret Chats use an additional client-to-client layer, are device-specific, are not part of the cloud, cannot be forwarded, and, Telegram says, leave no trace on its servers. The FAQ’s own question “Why not make all chats secret?” is answered by defending the split: cloud convenience on one side, a separate product for people who want messages that vanish from Telegram’s storage. Telegram states that it does not have Secret Chat content to disclose. The cryptographic description lives in core.telegram.org. As of client version 4.6, major official clients use MTProto 2.0; version 1.0 is deprecated. Secret Chat keys are Diffie-Hellman over a 2048-bit safe prime. Clients must validate that p and (p-1)/2 are prime, that g is a valid generator, and that g_a and g_b sit in a narrow range. After User B accepts, only the accepting device keeps the secret chat; other authorised devices receive encryptedChatDiscarded. Fingerprints of the shared key are shown as images so both people can compare them out of band; if the pictures differ, a man-in-the-middle during DH is possible. Official clients re-key after more than 100 messages or more than one week of use (with at least one message), discarding old keys — Telegram’s stated forward secrecy. Message keys in MTProto 2.0 are the middle 128 bits of SHA-256 over a slice of the shared key plus plaintext and 12–1024 padding bytes; AES-256 in IGE mode follows. Files in secret chats use one-time keys unrelated to the chat key. Security guidelines for client developers add checks that, if skipped, negate the protocol: verify msg_key after decrypt, reject illegal padding lengths, ignore replayed msg_ids, mix any server-supplied entropy into a local CSPRNG rather than using it raw. Those pages are instructions to implementers, including unofficial clients. They are not a proof that every third-party APK obeys them. ESET’s 22 July 2024 WeLiveSecurity article on the EvilVideo Android bug is used here only as a dated independent reminder that the official Android client is a large, feature-rich application whose media pipeline can fail independently of MTProto. ESET wrote that Telegram patched that issue in 10.14.5 on 11 July 2024. Client bugs and the cloud-versus-secret architecture are different layers: a patched APK can still store cloud chats on servers by design. Limits follow from Telegram’s own words. Groups and channels are not Secret Chats. Secret Chats do not roam to a new phone; logging out destroys them on that device. Screenshot alerts “may still be possible to bypass,” the FAQ says. Server-side source is not offered as a verifiable match to production, the FAQ notes, because users cannot confirm the running server code. Metadata such as IP addresses is a separate retention question; the FAQ-focused pages loaded here should not be stretched into a complete lawful-access policy. What this means in practice Treat default Telegram chats as readable by Telegram if it has the keys, which its architecture requires for multi-device cloud sync. Use Secret Chats, compare key pictures, and prefer official clients for sensitive one-to-one traffic — and still assume device malware wins. Do not put investigative sources in a large Telegram group and call it end-to-end encrypted. Cyber71 cannot retrieve a Secret Chat after a lost phone or compel Telegram to produce cloud-chat plaintext. What is still unclear Telegram’s living docs do not carry a newsroom timestamp; this item is dated 22 July 2024 because that is the independent ESET publication loaded alongside the official specifications. Formal proofs comparable to Signal’s academic literature are not on the MTProto pages. How Telegram splits keys “across jurisdictions,” a claim that appears in secondary explainers, is not specified in the core API article loaded here and is therefore not repeated as fact.

Sources

  1. Telegram Core — End-to-End Encryption, Secret Chats2026-09-24
  2. Telegram — Telegram FAQ — Secret Chats2026-09-24
  3. ESET WeLiveSecurity — Cursed tapes: Exploiting the EvilVideo vulnerability on Telegram for Android2026-09-24

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