On 13 July 2026, Nadim Abdo, Corporate Vice President for Identity and Network Access Engineering, announced that Microsoft Entra ID will make passkeys the default phishing-resistant method and will stop providing native SMS and voice as a Microsoft-operated channel. The blog’s timeline is the announcement this roadmap item tracks. What was announced, by whom, on what date: Microsoft, on 13 July 2026, said that beginning 1 September 2026, as the rollout reaches each organisation, users enabled for SMS or voice will be auto-enabled for passkeys and prompted to register one at the next MFA sign-in. On 1 February 2027, Microsoft-provided telecom delivery for SMS and voice will be retired and those methods will no longer be a native Entra capability. Organisations that still need telephony were told they could pick a partner through the Microsoft Security Store, paying the carrier. On 18 September 2026, Microsoft said it would share provider lists and pricing; from 30 October 2026, admins may configure a supported provider. After 1 February 2027, the blog said users who still rely on SMS or voice will be required to register a passkey before they can sign in, with no opt-out of that prompt. Dates apply to Entra ID in the public cloud; other clouds were promised a separate schedule. Microsoft Learn’s companion article, loaded for this briefing, adds granularity that the blog summarised more bluntly. Native SMS and voice retire on 1 February 2027 for all users except Global Administrators and external users; those two populations retire on 1 July 2027. Internal guest users stay on the February date. A temporary Graph opt-out (passkeyDynamicMigration) can delay automatic passkey enablement between September 2026 and February 2027; Learn says there is no opt-out of the eventual enforcement. Soprano and Telesign are named as initial private-preview telephony providers. Why Microsoft says it is doing this: the blog cites Microsoft Threat Intelligence observing AI-enabled phishing campaigns with click-through rates as high as 54%, versus about 12% for more traditional campaigns, and points to SIM swap and MFA-bypass as more accessible. Those figures are Microsoft’s threat-intelligence claims, not a Bangladesh-specific survey. Passkeys are described as public-key credentials — synced (iCloud Keychain, Google Password Manager) or device-bound (Authenticator passkeys, Entra passkey on Windows, FIDO2 keys) — resistant to phishing, SIM swap, and replay. What has not been confirmed: that every user will successfully register before February 2027; that partner SMS will be cheaper or more reliable; that on-premises Active Federation services follow the same dates; or that a user without a biometric device will have a smooth path. Help-desk load, break-glass accounts, and factory-floor shared tablets are operational problems Microsoft tells customers to plan for, not problems it claims to have solved in the announcement. What this means in practice Identity admins should inventory SMS/voice users now, enable passkeys in Authentication Methods Policy, run a registration campaign, and protect Global Admins with FIDO2 or Authenticator passkeys before July 2027. Users in Bangladesh on Microsoft 365 tenants will see prompts as their tenant is reached after 1 September 2026; they should register a passkey on a device they control and keep a second method. Cyber71 cannot postpone Microsoft’s tenant-wide enforcement or become a telephony broker. What is still unclear Exact public-cloud rollout order by tenant, the full Security Store price list as of this briefing, and how many organisations will keep SMS via partners are not in the 13 July post. The 54% phishing click-through figure is not accompanied here by a public paper. Device-bound versus synced passkey mix in enterprises remains a customer choice with different recovery stories. Microsoft’s public-cloud-only caveat is easy to miss in slide decks. National clouds, Azure Government, and other environments were explicitly deferred. A Bangladeshi company on a standard Microsoft 365 tenant is in scope for the September 2026 nudges; an organisation on a specialised cloud must wait for a later notice. Break-glass accounts that still use SMS as the only second factor are the failure mode Learn describes: after the retirement date, sign-in blocks until a passkey is registered. Planning should include at least two phishing-resistant methods for administrators, not one phone that can be lost.

Sources

  1. Microsoft Security Blog — Microsoft Entra ID security updates: Passkeys are the default authentication method in Entra ID2026-09-24
  2. Microsoft Learn — Passkeys by default and retirement of Microsoft-provided SMS and voice authentication2026-09-24

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