On 2 September 2026, the Citizen Lab at the University of Toronto, working with Serbia’s SHARE Foundation, published forensic findings on an iPhone belonging to a member of Serbia’s student protest movement. The person had received an Apple Threat Notification about mercenary-spyware targeting. Citizen Lab wrote that its analysis confirmed infection with NSO Group’s Pegasus, delivered by an iMessage zero-click exploit. It reported high-confidence indicators across December 2025 to January 2026 and said additional infections were not ruled out. The target asked to be named only as a movement member.
Citizen Lab’s claim, in its words, is that the exploit targeted iMessage and “has subsequently been patched by Apple as of iOS 18.4.1.” A zero-click infection, it noted, would not have been visible to the user and would give the operator access comparable to the user’s own: notes, photos, encrypted-message contents on the device, microphone, and camera. SHARE Foundation, Citizen Lab said, had documented at least 14 Apple Threat Notifications among Serbia’s student movement, civil society, and an opposition member of parliament. SHARE and Amnesty Tech were separately confirming a new NoviSpy Android implant on another student-movement device. Those Android findings are the NGOs’ claims, not Apple’s.
Apple’s own 16 April 2025 bulletin for iOS 18.4.1 and iPadOS 18.4.1 does not name Pegasus, NSO, or Serbia. It lists CVE-2025-31200 in CoreAudio: processing an audio stream in a maliciously crafted media file may result in code execution, addressed with improved bounds checking, credited to Apple and Google Threat Analysis Group, with Apple “aware of a report that this issue may have been exploited in an extremely sophisticated attack against specific targeted individuals on iOS.” CVE-2025-31201 in RPAC describes an attacker with arbitrary read and write capability bypassing Pointer Authentication, addressed by removing vulnerable code, credited to Apple, with the same in-the-wild sentence. Citizen Lab’s belief that iOS 18.4.1 killed the iMessage zero-click it saw is therefore adjacent to, not identical to, Apple’s two CVE write-ups. This briefing does not collapse them into a single assigned CVE for the Serbian case, because neither source makes that mapping explicit in the pages loaded.
Lockdown Mode remains Citizen Lab’s user-side recommendation for people who may be targeted because of who they are. Apple Threat Notifications, the Lab wrote, should be treated as presumed infection and followed by expert assistance — SHARE in Serbia, Access Now’s Digital Security Helpline elsewhere. Updating past 18.4.1 is necessary but not sufficient if the operator has already persisted.
What this means in practice
iMessage is a delivery surface for mercenary spyware even when the conversation protocol is encrypted: the exploit hits the parser before or beside PQ3’s confidentiality guarantees. High-risk users should enable Lockdown Mode, apply Apple’s threat-notification guidance, and keep devices updated. Recipients of a notification should assume compromise of tokens and chat backups until specialists say otherwise. Cyber71 is not an Apple authorised incident responder and cannot obtain extra forensic artefacts from Apple or NSO.
What is still unclear
Citizen Lab did not publish the exact CVE mapping, implant version, or operator customer in the 2 September 2026 post. Apple did not confirm that CVE-2025-31200/31201 are the Serbian chain. Whether later iOS 18.x or 26.x builds fully close related variants is not something this briefing can certify. The 14 threat notifications in Serbia are SHARE’s documented count, not a global prevalence study.
The Serbian case sits in a longer Citizen Lab record of iMessage-borne NSO chains, including FORCEDENTRY and BLASTPASS in earlier years, which the Lab has said were disclosed to Apple and patched. Those earlier reports are context, not evidence that the 2025–2026 implant used the same bugs. What is consistent is the Lab’s method: forensic artefacts after an Apple Threat Notification, high-confidence labels, and a recommendation to treat the device as burned until specialists image it. Apple’s threat-notification programme is the company’s own statement that it detected mercenary activity; it is not a public indictment of a named government customer.
For Bangladeshi civil society the transferable lesson is operational, not geographic. iMessage zero-clicks have been documented against activists in multiple countries. Lockdown Mode, rapid patching, and a plan for what to do if a threat notification arrives matter more than assuming Pegasus is a European-only story.
Sources
- The Citizen Lab — Pegasus Spyware Infection of Serbian Pro-Democracy Student Activist2026-09-24
- Apple Support — About the security content of iOS 18.4.1 and iPadOS 18.4.12026-09-24
Cyber71 links the primary material behind each report so readers can check it directly. External pages are not under our control and may change.
