Threat intelligence illustration
BGD e-GOV CIRT published an advisory on 30 July 2026 stating that SideWinder, which it described as a persistent APT group with suspected India-nexus affiliations, is conducting an active spear-phishing campaign targeting government organisations across South Asia, with Bangladesh identified as one of its primary targets. Between 21 April and 28 July 2026, CIRT said, the actor established typosquatting infrastructure of 11 parent domains and more than 60 impersonation subdomains designed to mimic government entities in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal and Pakistan, with additional lure infrastructure impersonating organisations associated with China, the United Arab Emirates, United States embassies and the United Nations office UNOCHA. For Bangladesh, CIRT said the campaign has been confirmed to impersonate at least nine government entities, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Home Affairs, Directorate of Secondary and Higher Education, Ministry of Civil Aviation and Tourism, Cabinet Division, Bangladesh Navy and the Embassy of Bangladesh in Ankara, plus a punycode variant of the official MoFA domain. This article reports CIRT’s account of domain impersonation and targeting. It does not state that those named bodies have been breached. CIRT wrote that the activity builds on previously documented SideWinder operations targeting several high-profile Bangladeshi organisations, including BTRC, ISPR, the Ministry of Finance, DGDP, DGFI, the Bangladesh Air Force, Bangladesh Police and the national government webmail portal mail.gov.bd. It assessed the likelihood of continued targeting of Bangladeshi government, defence and diplomatic organisations as High. Independent of the current campaign, CIRT summarised 2024–2025 reporting of lure content tied to army-govbd.info and credential-harvesting clusters impersonating DGDP, DGFI, BAF, Bangladesh Ordnance Factories, mail.gov.bd and Bangladesh Police, funneling credentials to mailbox3-inbox1-bd.com and mailbox-inbox-bd.com on a Frankfurt VPS. The current campaign, CIRT said, uses weaponized Microsoft Word and PDF documents. Attackers continue to exploit the Microsoft Office remote template injection vulnerability CVE-2017-0199. Two delivery kits operate concurrently. Kit 1 uses OLE remote template injection: DOCX samples beacon to /office-compatibility-suite and PDF samples to /adobe-reader, with all Kit 1 PDF samples additionally contacting e7.knd.vg for fingerprinting. Kit 2 uses CVE-2017-0199 OLE2Link exploitation via hosts including download-msoffice.com; CIRT said the Bangladesh Navy impersonation subdomain is hosted on that cluster. A third method uses phishing emails built around genuine publicly available documents as bait, referencing mofa.gov.bd while routing mail through nih.mail-egov.org. Operators also pair clean and weaponized versions of the same lure title, including a “China Power Supply Development Report 2026”. Lure themes relevant to Bangladesh included HR and pay-scale circulars, CEH training correspondence, a military-exercise theme labelled EXERCISE_CARAT_2026, diplomatic circulars and education-directorate notices. Parent domains listed by CIRT included fetchdrives.info, min-pk.com, interior-ministry.com, filenest.live, download-msoffice.com, vagued.live, mail-svr.co, pk-mailgov.com, fia-g0v.net, direct880.net and mail-egov.org. Confirmed Bangladesh-themed subdomains included mofa-gov-bd, mod-gov-bd, dshe-gov-bd, moha-gov-bd, mocat-gov-bd, bdnavy, cabinet-gov-bd and ankara-mofa-gov-bd. CIRT recommended patching CVE-2017-0199 and CVE-2017-11882, disabling automatic remote template loading, blocking the listed domains and the beacon e7.knd.vg, and training staff to verify the actual sending domain on messages that purport to come from *.gov.bd addresses. What this means for organisations in Bangladesh: Ministries and missions should hunt DNS logs for the listed typosquats and punycode MoFA lookalikes, sandbox DOCX and PDF attachments that fetch remote templates, and treat both Word and PDF copies of the same circular as potentially weaponized. Report suspected targeting to CIRT at cirt.gov.bd/report-incident, cti@cirt.gov.bd or info@cirt.gov.bd. Primary source: BGD e-GOV CIRT advisory “SideWinder Spear-Phishing Campaign Against Bangladesh Leveraging Dual-Format Weaponized Documents”, 30 July 2026.

Sources

  1. BGD e-GOV CIRT — SideWinder Spear-Phishing Campaign Against Bangladesh Leveraging Dual-Format Weaponized Documents2026-09-24

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