Threat intelligence illustration
BGD e-GOV CIRT published an advisory on 23 September 2026 reviewing recent reporting on a SideCopy campaign that uses spear-phishing, weaponized Windows shortcut files, mshta.exe, multilayer script obfuscation, .NET deserialization and reflective DLL loading to deploy a remote-access trojan. The attached TLP:CLEAR PDF rated the activity High and listed potentially affected sectors as government, defence and security, academic and research, and critical infrastructure. The advisory did not name a confirmed victim organisation in Bangladesh. CIRT said the campaign begins with a weaponized ZIP archive containing an LNK file disguised as a legitimate DOCX document. The PDF, labelled TLP:CLEAR and dated 23 September 2026, described the archive as also containing a decoy GIF or document, deceptive naming and a spoofed document icon. Execution of the LNK retrieves an HTA payload from attacker-controlled infrastructure through mshta.exe. The PDF named the LNK URL as docsportal.in with a PHP path under /public/reps/com/, and the retrieved HTA as com.hta. After later stages initialise, the HTA performs an anti-forensic deletion routine to remove itself from disk. The HTA stage, CIRT wrote, extracts additional components, establishes Registry Run Key persistence and loads the final RAT directly into the memory of mshta.exe. The PDF said the HTA contains an embedded DLL named ne4snapk.dll holding gzip-compressed components including appT.bat, startT.hta and Ioluegnt.dll, plus a decoy document. Persistence was observed at HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run pointing to C:\Users\Public\User\appT.bat, which launches mshta.exe against startT.hta with a hidden console. The second-stage HTA reconstructs a payload in memory using Base64 decoding, a secondary transformation, MemoryStream creation, binary object reconstruction, .NET BinaryFormatter deserialization and reflective DLL loading. The final payload Ioluegnt.dll is loaded into mshta.exe via System.Reflection.Assembly.Load and Activator.CreateInstance. The observed RAT, CIRT said, provides extensive remote-control and information-stealing capabilities, including system reconnaissance, password theft, clipboard collection, screenshots, file operations, command execution and file upload. The PDF listed command names including SystemInformation, Software, RD, Passwords, GetCPText, GetHostsFile, ListFiles, ListDrives, Run, Execute, Shell, fileupload, Rmfile, rnfile, Mkdir, rmdir and addSys. Data is exfiltrated through an encrypted TCP connection to attacker infrastructure over port 5863. CIRT emphasised that living-off-the-land and fileless execution reduce reliance on traditional malicious executables and therefore require behavioural, endpoint, network and email-based detection. What this means for organisations in Bangladesh: Government, defence-adjacent and research offices that receive ZIP archives purporting to be Word documents should treat unexpected LNK files inside archives as hostile, block outbound TCP 5863 where it is not required, and hunt for mshta.exe launching from user-writable paths such as C:\Users\Public\User. Report suspected incidents through CIRT’s report-incident form at cirt.gov.bd/report-incident or emails published on CIRT pages, including cti@cirt.gov.bd and info@cirt.gov.bd. Primary source: BGD e-GOV CIRT advisory “SideCopy Campaign Using MSHTA, Weaponized LNK and Fileless RAT Execution”, 23 September 2026, and the attached TLP:CLEAR PDF.

Sources

  1. BGD e-GOV CIRT — SideCopy Campaign Using MSHTA, Weaponized LNK and Fileless RAT Execution2026-09-24
  2. BGD e-GOV CIRT — SideCopy advisory PDF2026-09-24

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