Threat intelligence illustration
BGD e-GOV CIRT reported on 7 July 2026 that it had identified 153 unique Bangladesh IP addresses associated with an ongoing campaign it referred to as FortiBleed, affecting internet-facing Fortinet FortiGate security appliances. The advisory said affected systems had been reported with a “fortibleed” tag, indicating potential exposure to credential theft and unauthorised access after exploitation of FortiGate vulnerabilities. CIRT described the campaign as targeting FortiGate SSL-VPN and management interfaces to obtain user credentials, session data, authentication tokens and Active Directory-related artifacts. It said analysis by multiple cybersecurity organisations indicated that attackers were harvesting credentials from vulnerable FortiGate appliances and using that material to maintain persistent access to enterprise networks. Unlike campaigns that immediately drop ransomware, CIRT said FortiBleed focuses on taking authentication artifacts and reusing them, including through SSL-VPN, so that later access can look like a legitimate user. The advisory placed the activity in a global context, saying the campaign had been observed across 194 countries, with the 153 publicly exposed FortiGate devices in Bangladesh requiring immediate investigation. CIRT outlined a multi-stage model: internet-wide scanning of SSL-VPN portals and administrative interfaces, collection of authentication material, possible session hijacking through cookie or token replay, internal discovery of Active Directory and servers, credential dumping, and lateral movement. It noted that although FortiBleed is primarily a credential-compromise campaign, stolen VPN credentials are commonly reused by ransomware operators, and it listed families whose post-compromise sequences resemble that chain, including Akira, LockBit, INC, Play and Black Basta. CIRT advised organisations that operate FortiGate devices to verify whether their systems are affected, rotate all credentials associated with those appliances, review authentication logs and investigate for unauthorised access. Detection guidance in the advisory included monitoring unusual VPN logins, impossible travel, concurrent sessions, dormant-account use, privileged-account misuse and Active Directory enumeration. What this means for organisations in Bangladesh: Banks, government offices, telecom operators and private firms that still expose FortiGate SSL-VPN or management interfaces to the internet should treat CIRT’s 153-address finding as a prompt to inventory those devices, apply Fortinet’s published guidance, enforce multi-factor authentication in a way that cannot be bypassed by stolen session cookies, and hunt VPN logs for anomalies. CIRT did not name individual Bangladeshi organisations as confirmed victims. Report suspected compromise through CIRT’s incident form or the emails listed on CIRT pages. Primary source: BGD e-GOV CIRT advisory “FortiBleed Campaign Exposes FortiGate Devices in Bangladesh with Credential Compromise”, 7 July 2026.

Sources

  1. BGD e-GOV CIRT — FortiBleed Campaign Exposes FortiGate Devices in Bangladesh with Credential Compromise2026-09-24

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