BGD e-GOV CIRT issued an advisory on 13 July 2026 about EvilTokens, a phishing-as-a-service kit that abuses Microsoft’s OAuth 2.0 device authorisation grant, commonly called the device-code flow, to steal persistent Microsoft 365 access and refresh tokens. CIRT said the method does not require stealing a password and does not trigger an unusual multi-factor prompt, because the victim authenticates on the genuine Microsoft sign-in page.
CIRT described a “ghost phishing” layer in which landing-page content is delivered encrypted with AES-GCM and decrypted only in the victim’s browser, reducing what email gateways and sandboxes can see. It said attackers initiate a device-code request, socially engineer the victim to enter that attacker-generated code at microsoft.com/devicelogin, and then receive working tokens when the victim completes password and MFA as normal. Dynamic, on-click generation of a fresh device code, CIRT wrote, restarts the typical 15-minute validity window at the moment of interaction.
Reported victims, CIRT said, had primarily been organisations in North America and Europe. It added that the technique can target any organisation using Microsoft 365 or Entra ID. For Bangladesh, CIRT assessed the threat as directly relevant because EvilTokens is sold as a commodity kit with no regional restriction; the device-code flow is enabled by default in many tenants; government, banking and academic institutions in Bangladesh make extensive use of Microsoft 365; and encrypted browser-rendered lures can defeat network-perimeter filters that many local organisations rely on.
CIRT’s priority mitigation was to block the device-code authentication flow through Entra ID Conditional Access for all users and apps except documented exceptions such as meeting-room hardware, CI/CD systems or managed IoT. If the flow cannot be blocked entirely, it recommended restricting polling to corporate IP ranges. It also advised phishing-resistant MFA such as FIDO2 or authenticator passkeys rather than SMS or voice, and told users that an unsolicited “enter this code” prompt is a warning sign even on a genuine Microsoft domain.
What this means for organisations in Bangladesh: Ministries, banks, universities and private firms on Microsoft 365 should treat device-code phishing as an identity-control problem, not only an email-filter problem. Conditional Access changes, token-revocation playbooks and user guidance against pasting device codes from unexpected emails are the controls CIRT highlighted. If compromise is suspected, CIRT said refresh tokens should be revoked, the account disabled because access tokens may remain valid for up to an hour, malicious inbox rules removed, and newly registered devices revoked.
Primary source: BGD e-GOV CIRT advisory “Ghost Phishing: AES-GCM Encrypted Lures and EvilTokens Device-Code Phishing-as-a-Service Kit Targeting Microsoft 365 Accounts”, 13 July 2026.
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