Threat intelligence illustration
BGD e-GOV CIRT published an advisory on 17 August 2026 describing what it called an active, highly targeted cyber-espionage campaign directed at Bangladesh military and defence personnel. The national computer incident response team said security researchers had attributed the activity with high confidence to DoNot Team, also tracked as APT-C-35, a group known for intelligence-collection operations against government, military, diplomatic and strategic organisations in South Asia. According to the advisory, the observed intrusion started with a spear-phishing document presented as biographical material about a senior Bangladesh Air Force officer. CIRT named the lure file as “Biography Air Vice Marshal Sitwat Nayeem.doc”. It said the file used an RTF format despite the .doc extension and did not carry the main malware payload inside the document itself. Instead, CIRT reported that the file used remote template injection to fetch a malicious Microsoft Word template from attacker-controlled infrastructure. CIRT said the delivery infrastructure performed server-side victim filtering, sometimes described as geofencing, so that intended targets could receive malicious content while researchers, sandboxes, VPN users or other non-target systems might receive a benign template. Once a malicious template was delivered, the advisory described embedded VBA code executing architecture-specific shellcode inside the Microsoft Office process, followed by layered encoding, runtime API resolution, anti-hooking behaviour and payloads disguised with extensions such as .ico, .mp3 and .doc. The later stage, CIRT wrote, deployed a DLL implant that established scheduled-task persistence disguised as Microsoft OneDrive telemetry, collected host and software information, communicated over HTTPS, encrypted reconnaissance data with AES-128-CBC, ran a multi-phase command-and-control handshake, and could download further modules after victim profiling. Researchers retrieved a follow-on module named ejtest.dll from live command-and-control infrastructure, which CIRT said indicated the infrastructure was capable of delivering additional payloads at the time of investigation. CIRT assessed the activity as a critical cyber-espionage risk to Bangladesh’s defence and government ecosystem, citing the military-themed lure, selective delivery, active infrastructure and modular payloads. It listed potentially at-risk entities including the armed forces, the Ministry of Defence and related organisations, defence contractors, diplomatic missions, strategic government bodies, military research and educational institutions, and organisations that maintain trusted links with defence networks. The advisory did not name a confirmed victim organisation or claim that any named Bangladeshi institution had been breached. What this means for organisations in Bangladesh: Defence-adjacent ministries, contractors and any office that routinely opens Word documents from trusted-looking military contacts should treat unsolicited biographical or personnel files as high risk, restrict Office macros and remote template loading, and hunt for scheduled tasks imitating OneDrive telemetry. Suspected incidents can be submitted through BGD e-GOV CIRT’s report-incident form at cirt.gov.bd/report-incident or emailed to the addresses published on CIRT pages, including cti@cirt.gov.bd and info@cirt.gov.bd. Primary source: BGD e-GOV CIRT advisory “DoNot (APT-C-35) Cyber-Espionage Campaign Targeting Bangladesh Military and Defence Personnel”, 17 August 2026.

Sources

  1. BGD e-GOV CIRT — DoNot (APT-C-35) Cyber-Espionage Campaign Targeting Bangladesh Military and Defence Personnel2026-09-24

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