Threat intelligence illustration
BGD e-GOV CIRT reported on 17 May 2026 that it had identified a malicious campaign involving AsyncRAT, or Asynchronous Remote Access Trojan, infrastructure actively targeting Bangladesh. CIRT said threat intelligence and forensic analysis indicated that the domain ck44jili.com was functioning as a primary command-and-control node for an AsyncRAT operation. The advisory described a mix of malware delivery, remote access and financial fraud. Threat actors, CIRT said, disguised malicious payloads as legitimate software while also operating fraudulent online gambling infrastructure aimed at Bangladeshi users. Of particular concern, it wrote, the malicious infrastructure appeared designed to socially engineer Bangladesh-based victims through localised payment mechanisms including bKash, Nagad and Rocket, increasing the chance of both financial fraud and malware infection. CIRT said analysis confirmed that the malware payload masqueraded as a WinRAR utility executable named winrar-x64.exe while internally functioning as AsyncRAT version 0.5.8, enabling full remote control of infected systems. Persistence, according to the advisory, used a Windows scheduled task created at logon with the task name winrar-x64. CIRT also described anti-analysis behaviour including WMI-based fingerprinting, virtualisation detection and sandbox evasion. Detection recommendations in the advisory included hunting DNS and proxy logs for ck44jili.com and mail.emb666.com, monitoring outbound connections on TCP ports 6606, 7707 and 8808, querying scheduled tasks for the winrar-x64 name, and searching endpoints for winrar-x64.exe. Immediate response steps listed by CIRT were blocking malicious domains and suspicious ports, isolating infected systems and preserving forensic evidence, then removing malicious scheduled tasks, resetting credentials and inspecting other persistence. What this means for organisations in Bangladesh: Employee devices used for both work and personal browsing are exposed to fake software installers and gambling-themed sites that invoke familiar MFS brands. Endpoint teams should block the domains and ports CIRT listed, alert on unexpected WinRAR-named scheduled tasks, and remind staff that official compression tools are not distributed from gambling domains. Consumers should treat unsolicited gambling or “WinRAR update” downloads as hostile. Report infections to CIRT via the report-incident form or published contact emails. Primary source: BGD e-GOV CIRT advisory “AsyncRAT Malware Campaign Leveraging Fraudulent Gambling Infrastructure Targeting Bangladesh”, 17 May 2026.

Sources

  1. BGD e-GOV CIRT — AsyncRAT Malware Campaign Leveraging Fraudulent Gambling Infrastructure Targeting Bangladesh2026-09-24

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